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TEACHING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AFTER WINTER 
JEAN C. LOVE* 
INTRODUCTION 
When I teach Remedies, I begin with injunctions because it is the one topic 
in my Remedies course with which my students are the least familiar, and the 
one that best enables me to introduce them to the differences between legal and 
equitable relief. I start with an overview of the standards and procedures for 
determining whether to grant provisional injunctions and permanent 
injunctions.1 I then move into an in-depth study of each of the three types of 
injunctive relief: temporary restraining orders; preliminary injunctions; and 
permanent injunctions.2 Although in my course I examine both the procedures 
and the standards for determining whether to grant or deny each of the three 
types of injunctive relief, in this piece my focus will be primarily on the 
standards for determining whether to grant preliminary injunctions. I have 
chosen to focus on this topic because I want to consider how the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.3 has influenced the way in which I teach the standards for granting or 
denying preliminary injunctions. In particular, I want to talk about how I have 
approached the question of whether Winter mandates the adoption of the 
“traditional” test for preliminary injunctions to the exclusion of any “sliding 
scale” test, or whether it leaves open the possibility of applying an alternative 
“sliding scale” test as well. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR ISSUING INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF 
I begin my classroom conversation about injunctions with an overview of 
the standards and procedures for determining whether to grant injunctive relief 
 
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; Martha-Ellen Tye Professor of Law, Emerita, 
University of Iowa. The research for this Article was supported by a summer research grant 
provided by Santa Clara Law. 
 1. See CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON, 
EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS 13–36 (8th ed. 
2011). 
 2. See id. at 36–86, 111–28. 
 3. 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
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because, by the end of the first day of class, I want my students to understand 
the differences between the three types of injunctive relief and their 
relationship to each other. I assign three cases on the same theory of liability: 
Did the defendant (a state actor) deny equal recreational opportunities to the 
plaintiff (a young girl who wants to engage in contact sports such as football or 
wrestling or boxing) in a setting where the defendant provides only young boys 
with such recreational opportunities? In the first case, the plaintiff requests a 
temporary restraining order;4 in the second case, the plaintiff requests a 
preliminary injunction;5 and in the third case, the plaintiff requests a permanent 
injunction.6 
By focusing on these three cases, I am able to introduce my students to the 
procedural differences between temporary restraining orders and preliminary 
injunctions. I am also able to introduce them to the procedural differences 
between provisional injunctions and permanent injunctions. My hope is that 
they will leave the classroom with a basic understanding of how a case ought 
to move through the three potential procedural tiers of injunctive relief. 
By focusing on these three cases, I am also able to introduce my students 
to the differences and the similarities regarding the standards for determining 
whether to issue injunctive relief. I assign them the first two cases that apply 
the following “traditional” test for determining whether to grant a provisional 
injunction: 1) likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable harm (which 
encompasses proof of the inadequacy of the legal remedy as well as proof that 
the plaintiff urgently needs pre-trial injunctive relief); 3) whether the balance 
of hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and 4) whether the requested 
injunction would serve the public interest.7 Then I assign them the third case 
that applies the “traditional” test for determining whether to grant a permanent 
injunction: 1) actual success on the merits; 2) inadequacy of the legal remedy; 
3) whether the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and 4) whether 
the requested injunction would serve the public interest.8 I call my students’ 
 
 4. Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974), as reprinted in KOVACIC-
FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 1, at 18–21. 
 5. Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996), as reprinted in KOVACIC-
FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 1, at 22–27. 
 6. Force v. Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983), as reprinted 
in KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 1, at 28–35. 
 7. See Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1503–05, as reprinted in KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & 
NELSON, supra note 1, at 25–27; Clinton, 411 F. Supp. at 1399, as reprinted in KOVACIC-
FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 1, at 20. 
 8. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 1, at 28. For an application of this 
test, see Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1021–31, as reprinted in KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, 
supra note 1, at 28–35. In 2006, the United States Supreme Court handed down an opinion in a 
patent case that said: “Ordinarily, a federal court considering whether to award permanent 
injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies the four-factor test historically employed by 
courts of equity.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). I call this the 
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attention to the fact that the first prong of the “traditional” permanent 
injunction test is different from the first prong of the “traditional” provisional 
injunction test because a permanent injunction cannot issue until the plaintiff 
has proven actual success on the merits, whereas a plaintiff who is seeking 
provisional injunctive relief can do no more than show a “likelihood of success 
on the merits.” I then call their attention to the fact that the second prong of the 
“traditional” permanent injunction test is different from the second prong of 
the “traditional” provisional injunction test because the plaintiff at the 
permanent injunction stage of the proceedings is no longer seeking urgent, 
interim, pre-trial injunctive relief; rather, such a plaintiff is seeking a final 
equitable decree, and consequently, the plaintiff needs only to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the legal remedy.9 
II.  TEACHING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS PRIOR TO WINTER 
Prior to Winter, I used to begin my in-depth consideration of the standards 
for determining whether to issue a provisional injunction with a temporary 
restraining order case from the Eleventh Circuit that set out the “traditional” 
test for provisional injunctive relief.10 The point of this exercise was simply to 
 
“historical” test for permanent injunctive relief, as opposed to the “traditional” test for permanent 
injunctive relief. The eBay Court said that the “historical” four-factor test required the plaintiff to 
demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 
Id. at 391. 
Remedies scholars immediately said that they had never heard of the “historical” test. See 
Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 
REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007). I tell my students that the irreparable injury requirement does not 
appear in the “traditional” test and that the lower courts have had difficulty applying it under the 
“historical” test. In fact, the trial court judge on remand in eBay made a point of saying that “the 
requisite analysis for the second factor . . . inevitably overlaps with that of the first.” 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007). Nevertheless, the 
“historical” test has become the law of the federal court system, not only in patent cases, but also 
in other types of cases, such as environmental law cases. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010). For an excellent recent discussion of the eBay case, 
see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental 
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012). 
 9. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1992), as 
reprinted in KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, LOVE & NELSON, supra note 1, at 113. 
 10. See Morgan Stanley DW, Inc. v. Frisby, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001), as 
reprinted in ROBERT N. LEAVELL, JEAN C. LOVE, GRANT S. NELSON & CANDACE S. KOVACIC-
FLEISCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES 
45–50 (7th ed. 2005). 
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reinforce the lessons of the first day of class.11 Then I moved into a rather 
detailed consideration of alternative “sliding scale” tests for provisional 
injunctive relief by focusing on several preliminary injunction cases from a 
variety of federal circuits.12 The point of this exercise was to introduce my 
students to the dizzying array of alternative “sliding scale” standards that had 
been adopted by various federal circuits.13 Of course, there was always one 
student question that I could not answer: What does the United States Supreme 
Court think about the viability of any of these alternative “sliding scale” tests? 
Therefore, I was often known to wish aloud that we had an opinion from the 
United States Supreme Court that would provide us with an answer. Perhaps I 
should have remembered the old adage: Watch what you wish for! 
III.  TEACHING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AFTER WINTER 
The Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Winter on November 12, 
2008.14 In a nutshell, a majority of the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
application of an expansive “sliding scale” test that permitted the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction upon proof of a probability of success on the merits, 
coupled with proof of no more than a “possibility” of irreparable harm.15 The 
Court announced that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must prove 
that he or she is “likely” to succeed on the merits, and that he or she is “likely” 
to suffer irreparable harm.16 In addition, the Court announced that a plaintiff 
seeking a preliminary injunction must prove that the balance of equities tips in 
his or her favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.17 The Court’s 
stated rationale was that “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a 
possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of 
injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”18 
Now that I am teaching preliminary injunctions post-Winter, there are 
those who would tell me that the Supreme Court has given me the answer to 
my students’ question.19 And they would tell me that the answer is that the 
 
 11. See supra text accompanying notes 4–9. 
 12. See LEAVELL, LOVE, NELSON & KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, supra note 10, at 56–69. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
 15. Id. at 20–23. 
 16. Id. at 20. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 22. 
 19. See, e.g., Eric J. Murdock & Andrew J. Turner, How “Extraordinary” Is Injunctive 
Relief in Environmental Litigation? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10,464, 10,465 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s landmark 2008 decision in Winter 
reaffirmed in plain terms the requirement that federal courts must strictly apply the traditional 
legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief, even in cases involving claims of environmental 
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Court has chosen to adopt the “traditional” test for determining whether to 
grant provisional injunctive relief to the exclusion of any alternative “sliding 
scale” test.20 At first, I wondered whether this was the only plausible 
interpretation of Winter. Put another way, I wondered whether, going forward, 
Winter was the only case that I should assign to my students regarding the 
standards for issuing preliminary injunctive relief. But then I began to think 
about Winter more carefully, and I realized that Winter might not preclude the 
application of all “sliding scale” tests.21 Instead, it might permit the continued 
development of certain types of “sliding scale” tests, at least within certain 
constraints.22 
 
harm.”); Rachel A. Weisshaar, Note, Hazy Shades of Winter: Resolving the Circuit Split over 
Preliminary Injunctions, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1011, 1048 (2012) (“The Supreme Court should 
adopt a sequential preliminary injunction test. Arguably, it already did in Winter, for the 
following reasons: (1) the most natural reading of Winter is that it stated a sequential test; (2) the 
Supreme Court in other decisions has cited Winter as supporting a sequential test; (3) Munaf, 
Nken, and earlier Supreme Court decisions support the notion that likely success on the merits is a 
required element of the preliminary injunction test; (4) the likely-success-on-the-merits test is 
easier for judges to apply consistently than the serious-questions test; and (5) in most instances, 
federal judges have the institutional expertise to predict the merits of a case at the preliminary 
injunction stage, so a serious-questions test that relaxes and confuses this inquiry is 
unnecessary.”). 
 20. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Because 
of its differences with the Winter test, the Blackwelder balance-of-hardship test may no longer be 
applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions in the Fourth Circuit, as the standard 
articulated in Winter governs the issuance of preliminary injunctions not only in the Fourth 
Circuit but in all federal courts.”), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010), legal standard for 
preliminary injunction reinstated, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting the four-prong Winter test for 
preliminary injunctions and then stating “[t]o the extent that our cases have suggested a lesser 
standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable”). The American Trucking case was later 
distinguished by the Ninth Circuit on the ground that: “[In American Trucking,] [w]e discussed 
the holding of Winter that a preliminary injunction requires a showing of likely irreparable injury, 
but we did not discuss whether some version of the sliding scale test survived.” Alliance for the 
Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying petitions for rehearing 
and rehearing en banc of Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) 
and withdrawing and replacing that opinion with this opinion). The Department of Justice had 
petitioned for a rehearing of the original Alliance for the Wild Rockies decision on the ground that 
“‘the [Ninth Circuit’s] holding that the serious questions test survives Winter conflicts with 
Winter.’” Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary 
Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1542 n.118 (2011). 
 21. See, e.g., Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134 (“[W]e join the Seventh and 
the Second Circuits in concluding that the ‘serious questions’ version of the sliding scale test for 
preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.”). 
 22. See id. at 1134–35 (“A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff 
demonstrates . . . that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of 
hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor . . . . Of course, plaintiffs must also satisfy the other 
Winter factors.”); see also Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard 
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IV.  TEACHING WINTER 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Tests for Determining Whether to Grant a 
Preliminary Injunction 
Winter arose out of the Ninth Circuit, which initially applied only the 
“traditional” test for determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. 
The Ninth Circuit required proof of 1) a “strong likelihood” of success on the 
merits or a “reasonable certainty” that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; 
and 2) irreparable harm.23 It also required proof that “3) in balancing the 
equities, the defendant[] will not be harmed more than [the] plaintiff is helped 
by the injunction, and 4) granting the injunction is in the public interest.”24 The 
Ninth Circuit first applied an alternative “sliding scale” test in 1972, when it 
affirmed a preliminary injunction in an antitrust case on the basis that there 
were serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships 
tipped decidedly toward the moving party.25 In that 1972 case, the Ninth 
Circuit’s “sliding scale” test was patterned after a “sliding scale” test that had 
been developed by the Second Circuit in an earlier antitrust action.26 
In 1975, the Ninth Circuit once again turned to the Second Circuit for help 
in developing its “sliding scale” test. In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. 
ITT Continental Baking Co., the trial court had denied a preliminary injunction 
to the plaintiff in an antitrust case under the “traditional” standard because the 
plaintiff had failed to prove a “probability of success” on the merits.27 The 
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to prove a 
“probability of success” on the merits, but it ruled that the trial court had made 
an error of law: “There is . . . an alternative test that the district court did not 
apply.”28 Since the Ninth Circuit had adopted a “sliding scale” test in 1972, it 
reversed and remanded William Inglis so that the district court could apply the 
appellate court’s “sliding scale” test in the first instance.29 Then the appellate 
 
for Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522, 1556 (2011) (arguing 
that federal courts after Winter should be able to balance the four factors in the Winter test, and 
that they should be able to adopt a “serious questions” test that would suffice for the “likelihood 
of success” prong of the Winter test). 
 23. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 24. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
 25. See Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941, 943 (9th Cir. 
1972). 
 26. See id. (citing Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 
1953) (applying a sliding scale test that permitted a moving party to obtain a temporary injunction 
upon proof of serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tipped 
“decidedly” toward the moving party)). 
 27. William Inglis, 526 F.2d at 87–88. 
 28. Id. at 88. 
 29. Id. 
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court gave the trial court specific guidance regarding the proper wording of the 
Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” test by quoting from Charlie’s Girls, Inc. v. 
Revlon, Inc.,30 a Second Circuit case that had been handed down in 1973: “One 
moving for a preliminary injunction assumes the burden of demonstrating 
either a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable 
harm or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips 
sharply in his favor.”31 
The primary problem with the two-part, two-prong “sliding scale” test that 
had been adopted by both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit as of 1975 
was that it did not refer to all of the elements of the four-prong “traditional” 
test. It made it very clear that a movant could qualify for a preliminary 
injunction upon proof of either “probable success” on the merits (under the 
first prong of the first part), or “serious questions” regarding the merits (under 
the first prong of the second part). But it referred to “irreparable harm” only in 
the second prong of the first part, where it required proof of no more than a 
“possibility of irreparable harm.” And it referred to the “balance of hardships” 
only in the second prong of the second part, where it required proof that “the 
balance of hardships tips sharply in [the movant’s] favor.” Finally, it made no 
reference in either part to the question of whether the requested preliminary 
injunction would be in the “public interest.”32 
The Second Circuit soon realized that there were gaps in its statement of its 
“sliding scale” test, and it began to fill them in. First of all, in a 1976 antitrust 
case, the Second Circuit considered the question of whether the movant had to 
prove irreparable harm under the second part of its “sliding scale” test, 
concluding that the answer was yes because proof of “irreparable harm” is a 
“fundamental and traditional requirement of all preliminary injunctive relief.”33 
The court articulated the policy behind its holding as follows: “If the element 
of irreparable damage is prerequisite for relief where the plaintiff must show 
probable success on the merits, then a fortiori where the plaintiff establishes 
something less than probable success as to the merits, need for proof of the 
threat of irreparable damage is even more pronounced.”34 Second, in 1979, in 
Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,35 the Second Circuit officially 
revised its two-part, two-prong “sliding scale” test, turning it into a two-part, 
three-prong “sliding scale” test, which says that a party who wants preliminary 
 
 30. 483 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 31. William Inglis, 526 F.2d at 88 (quoting Charlie’s Girls, 483 F.2d at 954). 
 32. For the text of the “traditional” test and the text of the two-part, two-prong “sliding 
scale” test, the two tests that are compared in this paragraph, see supra text accompanying notes 
23–31. 
 33. Triebwasser & Katz v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 34. Id. 
 35. 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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injunctive relief must show: “(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood 
of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits 
to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping 
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.”36 The Jackson 
Dairy “sliding scale” test thus eliminated the Charlie’s Girls test’s reference to 
a “possibility of irreparable harm” as a permissible basis for obtaining 
preliminary injunctive relief.37 Finally, in 1982, the Second Circuit held that it 
would also take into account the public interest in applying its Jackson Dairy 
“sliding scale” test because the Second Circuit had long held that it could “go 
much further both to give or to withhold relief in furtherance of the public 
interest than where only private interests are involved.”38 I point out to my 
students that the Jackson Dairy test comes much closer to comporting with the 
Winter test39 than does the Charlie’s Girls test.40 Indeed, I tell them that in 
2010, the Second Circuit held that it would continue to apply its Jackson Dairy 
“sliding scale” test post-Winter because it saw no conflict between the two 
tests.41 
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt the Second Circuit’s Jackson Dairy 
“sliding scale” test. Instead, the Ninth Circuit developed the notion, under its 
two-part, two-prong “sliding scale” test, “that there are not really two entirely 
separate tests, but . . . merely extremes of a single continuum.”42 The Ninth 
Circuit announced that the critical element in determining which part of its 
“sliding scale” test ought to be applied in any given case is the relative 
hardship to the parties: “If the balance of harm tips decidedly toward the 
plaintiff, then the plaintiff need not show as robust a likelihood of success on 
the merits as when the balance tips less decidedly.”43 And the Ninth Circuit 
further announced that, in the process of balancing the hardships, the trial court 
must first find that the plaintiff will suffer “irreparable harm” in the absence of 
 
 36. Id. at 72. 
 37. For a statement of the Charlie’s Girls test, see supra text accompanying note 31. 
 38. Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 711 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115, 1121 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 39. For a statement of the Winter test, see supra text accompanying notes 15–17. 
 40. For a statement of the Charlie’s Girls test, see supra text accompanying note 31. 
 41. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 
30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010). Citigroup specifically rejected the notion that a preliminary injunction 
may issue only upon proof that “ultimate success on the merits is more likely than not” because 
“[l]imiting the preliminary injunction to cases that do not present significant difficulties would 
deprive the remedy of much of its utility.” Id. at 35–36. The Seventh Circuit has also held that 
there is no conflict between the Winter test and its pre-Winter “sliding scale test.” See Hoosier 
Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 42. Benda v. Grand Lodge of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308, 
315 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 43. Id. 
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a preliminary injunction.44 The Ninth Circuit also explained that “[n]o chance 
of success at all . . . will not suffice” under its “sliding scale” test.45 Rather, the 
“irreducible minimum” is a “fair chance of success on the merits” or questions 
“serious enough to require litigation.”46 Finally, in 1983, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo47 
mandated the consideration of “the public interest” in “any injunctive action in 
which the public interest is affected,” including any action for a preliminary 
injunction.48 
In short, by 1983, both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit were 
applying a “sliding scale” test, but the Second Circuit’s two-part, three-prong 
test was stated much more clearly and completely than the Ninth Circuit’s two-
part, two-prong test. And, although the Second Circuit in Jackson Dairy had 
collapsed its “traditional” test into its alternative two-part, three-prong 
(sometimes four-prong) “sliding scale” test, the Ninth Circuit purported to 
have retained its “traditional” test even after it had adopted its alternative two-
part, two-prong (or three-prong, or sometimes four-prong) “sliding scale” 
test.49 The confusion in the Ninth Circuit came to a head in Regents of the 
University of California v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,50 an 
antitrust case in which the trial court had granted a preliminary injunction. The 
Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction, finding that the trial court had granted the 
injunction under the “traditional” test.51 But the Ninth Circuit took the 
occasion to observe that “[t]his circuit has formulated different descriptions, 
some simple and some ornate, of the correct legal standard for the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.”52 The court went on to say: “Long or short, old or 
new, these tests are not separate tests but [rather] the outer reaches of a single 
continuum.”53 The court then made a very astute observation about the 
relationship between the Ninth Circuit’s “traditional” test and its alternative 
“sliding scale” test. It said: “[T]he district court utilized the middle standard in 
 
 44. Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 45. Benda, 584 F.2d at 315. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (action for permanent injunction). 
 48. Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1983) (action for 
preliminary injunction). 
 49. For the development of the “sliding scale” test in both the Second Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit, see supra text accompanying notes 27–48. 
 50. 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 51. Id. at 515. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (quoting L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 
1201 (9th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the ‘continuum,’ which has been described as the ‘traditional’ standard in this 
circuit.”54 
I find that my students are best able to understand the pre-Winter 
relationship between the Ninth Circuit’s “traditional” test and its “sliding 
scale” test if I use the language of the Regents case and describe the two tests 
as being part of “a single continuum.” In the middle of the continuum is the 
“traditional” test, which requires proof of (1) a “strong likelihood of success on 
the merits” and (2) irreparable harm.55 It also requires proof that (3) the 
balance of the hardships tips to the plaintiff and (4) the public interest favors 
the issuance of the injunction.56 On one far end of the continuum is the first 
part of the “sliding scale” test. It requires proof of (1) “probable success on the 
merits” and (2) “the possibility of irreparable injury.”57 It may also require 
proof that (3) the balance of hardships tips to the plaintiff and (4) the public 
interest favors the issuance of the injunction.58 At the other far end of the 
continuum is the second part of the “sliding scale” test. It requires proof that 
(1) “serious questions are raised” as to the merits59 and (2) the plaintiff has 
suffered “irreparable harm.”60 It also requires proof that (3) the balance of 
hardships “tips sharply” in favor of the plaintiff;61 and it may require proof that 
(4) the public interest favors the issuance of the injunction.62 
B. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Rejects the Ninth 
Circuit’s “Possibility of Irreparable Harm” Test for Preliminary 
Injunctions 
1. Winter in the Lower Federal Courts 
After studying the Ninth Circuit’s development of both its “traditional” test 
and its “sliding scale” test, my students are ready to consider the application of 
that body of law to the facts in the Winter case. The plaintiffs in Winter were 
the National Resources Defense Council, Jean-Michael Cousteau (an 
environmental enthusiast and filmmaker), and several other groups devoted to 
the protection of marine mammals.63 One of the defendants was the Navy, 
 
 54. Regents, 747 F.2d at 515. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 58. See Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 966–67 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 59. Save Our Sonoran, 408 F.3d at 1120. 
 60. Id. at 1124. 
 61. Id. at 1120. 
 62. See Am. Motorcyclist Ass’n, 714 F.2d at 966–67. 
 63. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 
518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
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which prepares for war by conducting training exercises at sea.64 In this case, 
the Navy planned to use modern sonar during training exercises to detect and 
track submarines in the waters off the coast of Southern California 
(“SOCAL”).65 
The plaintiffs complained that the Navy’s sonar training exercises would 
cause serious harm to various species of marine mammals (including dolphins 
and whales), and by extension, to themselves.66 In particular, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the Navy’s training exercises would cause much more serious 
injuries to marine mammals than the Navy acknowledged, including 
permanent hearing loss, decompression sickness, and major behavioral 
disruptions.67 The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy had violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) by finding no significant environmental 
impact after conducting an inadequate Environmental Assessment (“EA”), and 
by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) prior to 
conducting its sonar training exercises.68 The plaintiffs requested a preliminary 
injunction that would enjoin the Navy from conducting its remaining SOCAL 
sonar training exercises.69 
The Navy asserted that there was insufficient evidence that its SOCAL 
sonar training exercises would cause irreparable harm to marine mammals 
because the Navy had been conducting SOCAL sonar training exercises for the 
past forty years, and there was no evidence that marine mammals had been 
harmed during that entire period of time.70 The plaintiffs responded by citing to 
the Navy’s own EA, which had documented the future threat of harm to the 
environment (including threats of harm to marine mammals) that would be 
caused by the planned SOCAL sonar training exercises.71 
The district court judge, Florence-Marie Cooper, in the phase of the case 
that went to the United States Supreme Court, applied the first part of the Ninth 
Circuit’s “sliding scale” test. She found that the plaintiffs had proven a 
“probability of success” on the merits and at least a “possibility of irreparable 
harm.”72 In point of fact, she found (based on the Navy’s own EA) that the 
plaintiffs had established a “near certainty” of irreparable harm to the 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1112. 
 66. Id. at 1118. 
 67. Id. at 1119. 
 68. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1113–14. 
 69. Id. at 1113. 
 70. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 692 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 555 U.S. 7 
(2008). 
 71. Id. at 691–92. 
 72. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1115, 1118. 
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environment.73 She then concluded her opinion with one final sentence 
regarding the balance of hardships and the public interest. She said: 
The Court is also satisfied that the balance of hardships tips in favor of 
granting an injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public 
interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur (or the public interest 
would suffer) if Defendants were prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the 
use of effective mitigation measures, during a subset of their regular activities 
in one part of one state for a limited period.74 
The district court judge entered a preliminary injunction that allowed the Navy 
to conduct the remaining SOCAL exercises, provided it employed certain 
measures intended to mitigate the impact of the Navy’s use of MFA sonar on 
the environment.75 
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Betty B. Fletcher, 
approved the district court’s application of the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” 
test and affirmed the preliminary injunction.76 Judge Fletcher acknowledged 
that the Navy had argued that “no sonar-inflicted injuries have been observed 
in the Southern California Operating Area in almost forty years of MFA sonar 
use by the Navy,”77 but she explained “that fact has limited probative value in 
establishing whether marine mammals will in fact be harmed by the Navy’s 
use of MFA sonar.”78 Furthermore, she affirmed the district court’s conclusion 
that the plaintiffs had established a “near certainty” of irreparable harm in the 
future based on the Navy’s own EA.79 
In support of its application of the first part of the “sliding scale” test, the 
district court cited an earlier environmental law case, Earth Island Institute v. 
United States Forest Service (“Earth Island II”).80 In Earth Island II, the 
plaintiffs had brought an action to enjoin post-fire restoration projects for 
logging in national forests in an effort to protect the natural habitat of the 
California spotted owl.81 The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge 
William A. Fletcher, reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction by the 
district court on the ground that the district court had misconstrued the Ninth 
Circuit’s “sliding scale” test.82 
 
 73. Id. at 1118. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1118–21. 
 76. Winter, 518 F.3d at 703. 
 77. Id. at 692. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 696. 
 80. See Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. 
 81. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter 
Earth Island II]. 
 82. Id. at 1158–59. 
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At the outset of Earth Island II, the trial court judge had correctly stated 
the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” test: 
[I]n order to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a party must 
demonstrate either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the 
possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and the 
balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of granting the requested 
injunction.83 
However, the district court judge had then stated that, under either part of the 
“sliding scale” test, the plaintiff was required to show a “significant threat of 
irreparable injury.”84 During the preliminary injunction hearing, the trial court 
judge had said: “[E]ven if there is shown to be a probability of success on the 
merits by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have not shown at this time that there is a 
significant threat of irreparable injury by clear and convincing evidence, which 
is the standard.”85 The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court judge had 
properly applied the “significant threat of irreparable injury” standard as set 
forth in one of the Ninth Circuit’s earlier cases, Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. 
Chronicle Publishing Co.86 The defendant further contended that “the words 
‘significant threat of irreparable injury’ are not the equivalent of the ‘concrete 
probability of irreparable harm’ standard” that had been used erroneously by 
the same trial court judge in Earth Island I,87 an earlier environmental law case 
involving the same parties.88 The Ninth Circuit in Earth Island II responded: 
“While it is true that ‘significant threat’ and ‘concrete probability’ are different 
words, what matters is that both standards impose a higher burden of proof on 
Earth Island by going beyond the ‘mere possibility of irreparable harm’ 
standard.”89 The Ninth Circuit in Earth Island II then went on to distinguish 
the Oakland Tribune case on the ground that the antitrust plaintiff in that case 
had shown “a very low likelihood on the success of the merits of its claim, 
thereby justifying the higher standard of harm.”90 In Earth Island II, by 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court judge had erroneously 
applied the higher standard of harm from the outset without first determining 
the likelihood of Earth Island’s success on the merits.91 
 
 83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Id. at 1159 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Earth Island II, 442 F.3d at 1159. 
 87. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 88. Earth Island II, 442 F.3d at 1158–59. 
 89. Id. at 1159. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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2. The Parties’ Briefs to the Supreme Court in Winter 
When the Navy in Winter appealed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling to the United 
States Supreme Court, it focused much of its attention on the Earth Island II 
case. The relevant heading in the Navy’s Brief for the Petitioners said: “The 
‘Mere Possibility’ Of Irreparable Harm Cannot Support The Preliminary 
Injunction.”92 The first paragraph of the Navy’s brief under that heading said: 
“The Ninth Circuit [in Winter] further erred in holding that respondents need 
only show a ‘mere possibility’ of irreparable harm to justify such relief, 
rejecting the proposition that a ‘significant threat of irreparable injury’ must be 
shown.”93 The Navy’s brief asserted that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s ‘mere 
possibility’ standard expands the courts’ equitable powers well beyond their 
traditional moorings and cannot be reconciled with the ‘stringent’ standard this 
Court has laid down for preliminary injunctive relief.”94 The Navy took the 
position that the Winter plaintiffs should be required to prove “a likelihood of 
irreparable injury,” and not just the “mere possibility of irreparable injury,” 
citing to a Second Circuit case that required proof of a “likelihood,” rather than 
a “possibility,” of irreparable injury because “[l]ikelihood sets, of course, a 
higher standard than possibility.”95 The Navy complained that the Ninth 
Circuit’s “mere possibility” standard “effectively” shifted the burden of proof 
to the Navy to prove that “irreparable injury would not occur in the absence of 
injunctive relief,” and the Navy asserted that it could not meet that burden of 
proof when “there is considerable scientific uncertainty” about a particular 
type of environmental harm, such as the alleged harm to the marine mammals 
in Winter.96 Finally, the Navy described a preliminary injunction as an 
“extraordinary and drastic remedy” because it applies “equitable power before 
a court fully adjudicates a case,” and then the Navy argued that the “party 
requesting [a preliminary injunction] must therefore proffer substantial proof 
and make a clear showing that such extraordinary relief is necessary.”97 
The Brief for the Respondents in Winter did little to rebut the Navy’s 
objections to the Ninth Circuit’s “mere possibility” test for irreparable harm, 
simply stating in a heading: “The Courts Below Applied Traditional Equitable 
Principles In Granting Tailored Preliminary Relief.”98 The brief cited only one 
 
 92. Brief for the Petitioners at 38, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 
(2008) (No. 07-1239). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)). 
 95. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 92, at 39 (quoting JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-Wrap, 
Inc., 917 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 92, at 39. 
 97. Id. (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 98. Brief for the Respondents at 38, Winter, 555 U.S. 7 (No. 07-1239). 
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case from the Fourth Circuit that clearly supported the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction upon proof of a possibility of irreparable harm (and then 
only upon further proof of a probability of success on the merits).99 Therefore, 
the Brief for the Respondents in Winter focused primarily on the trial court’s 
findings of fact: “Despite the Navy’s claims to the contrary, the lower courts’ 
irreparable harm analysis did not rest on a finding of ‘mere possibility.’”100 
Rather, “[t]he district court held (and the Ninth Circuit specifically affirmed) 
that Respondents had established ‘to a near certainty’ irreparable harm ‘to the 
environment.’”101 The Brief for the Respondents asserted that, without 
question, the district court’s finding of a “near certainty” of irreparable harm 
had to be affirmed “absent clear error.”102 And the trial court judge had made 
no such error because she had based her finding on “extensive scientific 
evidence showing the MFA sonar causes serious, debilitating, and even lethal 
injuries as well as ‘profound’ and widespread behavioral disruptions in marine 
mammals.”103 “Because the district court’s finding of a ‘near certainty’ of 
irreparable harm [was] plainly supported by the record,” the Brief for the 
Respondents took the position that Winter was “not a proper case to decide 
whether, and under what circumstances, injunctive relief may issue on a 
showing of a ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm.”104 Nonetheless, if the Court 
were to reach the issue, the Brief for the Respondents asserted that 1) “the 
Ninth Circuit’s sliding-scale irreparable harm standard is entirely consistent 
with this Court’s precedents and with the rule in other circuits;”105 and 2) there 
is a “broad consensus in favor of a sliding-scale approach [which] is especially 
sensible in the context of NEPA,” a statute that is designed to protect the 
environment.106 
The Navy’s Reply Brief for the Petitioners chastised the Respondents for 
their “half-hearted” defense of the Ninth Circuit’s allegedly erroneous “mere 
possibility” of irreparable harm standard for preliminary injunctive relief.107 
The Reply Brief criticized the fact that the Respondents had tried to dodge the 
Navy’s objections to the Ninth Circuit’s “mere possibility” standard by 
focusing on the trial court’s factual finding of a near certainty of irreparable 
harm.108 The Navy also asserted that the record did not support the trial court’s 
 
 99. Id. at 49 (citing Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Selig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 
1977), overruled by Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 100. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 98, at 41 (citation omitted). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 42. 
 104. Id. at 48. 
 105. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 98, at 49. 
 106. Id. at 50. 
 107. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Winter, 555 U.S. 7 (No. 07-1239). 
 108. Id. at 18. 
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factual finding because the intermediate appellate court had acknowledged that 
the record contains “‘no evidence’ that marine mammals have been harmed 
during the 40 years of MFA sonar training in SOCAL.”109 Finally, the Navy 
conceded that the Respondents had invoked a “sliding scale” test that “some 
courts use in evaluating a likelihood of irreparable injury.”110 But then the 
Navy said: “Even assuming that the requisite showing of injury may vary 
somewhat, . . . the Ninth Circuit’s ‘mere possibility’ standard, which expressly 
rejects the need for any ‘significant threat’ of injury, establishes a threshold 
that cannot be squared with the extraordinary nature of preliminary relief.”111 
Indeed, the Navy concluded, the “mere possibility” standard “renders the 
likelihood-of-irreparable-injury test virtually meaningless.”112 
I tell my students about the parties’ briefs to the United States Supreme 
Court in Winter. Then I ask my students whether the Navy in Winter was 
arguing for the complete abolition of all federal circuit court sliding scale tests, 
or whether the Navy was only asking the Supreme Court to overrule the “mere 
possibility” of irreparable harm standard which had been reaffirmed by the 
Ninth Circuit in Earth Island II and which later had been applied by the district 
court in Winter. 
3. The United States Supreme Court’s Majority and Dissenting Opinions 
in Winter 
a. Chief Justice Roberts’s Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Roberts opened his opinion for a majority of the Court in 
Winter with an observation that the Ninth Circuit had upheld the trial court’s 
preliminary injunction imposing mitigation measures on the Navy’s SOCAL 
sonar training, even though the Ninth Circuit had “acknowledged that ‘the 
record contains no evidence that marine mammals have been harmed’ by the 
Navy’s exercises,” and even though the Navy had been doing SOCAL sonar 
training exercises “for the past 40 years.”113 He then announced: “The Court of 
Appeals was wrong, and its decision is reversed.”114 
I ask my students: “On what basis did the Supreme Court actually reverse 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Winter?” I point out to them that Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion announced at the outset: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary 
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (citation omitted). 
 112. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 107, at 18. 
 113. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 12 (2008). 
 114. Id. 
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balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 
interest.”115 I make the observation that the Winter test for preliminary 
injunctive relief is somewhat akin to the Ninth Circuit’s “traditional” test for 
determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief,116 and therefore one 
might be tempted to think that Winter rejects the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” 
test117outright. But then I remind my students that the Supreme Court in Winter 
was reviewing a Ninth Circuit decision that had applied the first part of the 
Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” test to uphold the trial court’s preliminary 
injunction, and therefore perhaps one ought to interpret the Court’s decision in 
Winter as a modification of the first part of the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Winter 
“sliding scale” test. 
In reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold the preliminary 
injunction in Winter under Earth Island II’s “mere possibility of irreparable 
harm” standard, Chief Justice Roberts said: “We agree with the Navy that the 
Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.”118 He went on to say that 
the Court would instead adopt a standard that requires plaintiffs seeking a 
preliminary injunction to demonstrate that “irreparable injury is likely in the 
absence of an injunction.” 119 As a matter of policy, he said that granting a 
preliminary injunction on the basis of no more than a “possibility of irreparable 
harm” was inconsistent with the Court’s characterization of injunctive relief as 
an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”120 But having rejected Earth Island II’s 
“possibility” standard, Chief Justice Roberts backed away from holding that he 
was reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the ground that the trial court had 
failed to find that the plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable harm.121 After all, 
the Ninth Circuit had affirmed the trial court’s factual finding that there was a 
“near certainty” of irreparable harm.122 Instead, he said: “It is not clear that 
articulating the incorrect standard affected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of 
irreparable harm.”123 In other words, the Ninth Circuit’s error in articulating 
the “possibility” standard might have been a harmless error because the Ninth 
Circuit had “affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs had 
established a ‘near certainty’ of irreparable harm.”124 
 
 115. Id. at 20. 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 23–24. 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 118. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 
 124. Id. 
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Chief Justice Roberts then shifted from the second prong of the Winter test 
to the third and fourth prongs. He said that “even if plaintiffs have shown 
irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exercises, any such injury is 
outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic 
training of its sailors.”125 He emphasized that a “proper consideration of 
[those] factors alone requires denial of the requested injunctive relief.”126 He 
then added that, for the same reason, it would not be necessary for the Court to 
address the lower courts’ holding that the “plaintiffs have also established a 
likelihood of success on the merits.”127 Chief Justice Roberts ended his opinion 
by observing that national security and military interests do not always trump 
other considerations when determining whether to grant a preliminary 
injunction.128 However, he said that in Winter “the proper determination of 
where the public interest lies does not strike us as a close question.”129 
The issue on the table for my students after reading Chief Justice Robert’s 
opinion in Winter is whether he has foreclosed access to the “sliding scale” test 
in the federal court system, or whether he has simply revised the first part of 
the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” test. At first, my students are inclined to 
think that Chief Justice Roberts has foreclosed access to the “sliding scale” test 
in the federal court system. But then, when they read the dissenting opinion by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, they realize that they might just be wrong about 
that. 
b. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg opened her dissenting opinion with a criticism of the 
Navy: “If the Navy had completed the EIS before taking action, as NEPA 
instructs, the parties and the public could have benefited from the 
environmental analysis—and the Navy’s training could have proceeded 
without interruption.”130 Instead, she said, the Navy acted first, and only later 
agreed to complete the EIS at some point in time in the future.131 As a result, 
she announced that she would hold that, by imposing appropriate measures to 
mitigate harm until the completion of the EIS, the District Court had correctly 
balanced the equities and did not abuse its discretion.132 
Next, Justice Ginsburg took up the question of whether Chief Justice 
Roberts had rejected the “sliding scale” test for preliminary injunctions in the 
 
 125. Id. at 23. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 23–24. 
 128. Winter, 555 U.S. at 26. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 43–44. 
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federal court system. She began by emphasizing that the hallmark of equity 
jurisdiction is flexibility and the exercise of equitable discretion.133 She then 
noted that equity courts “do not insist that litigants uniformly show a 
particular, predetermined quantum of probable success or injury before 
awarding equitable relief.”134 More to the point, she observed that the lower 
federal courts “have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’ 
sometimes awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the 
likelihood of success is very high” (as in Winter).135 She emphasized that, in a 
NEPA case, because the EIS is a “tool for uncovering environmental harm, 
environmental plaintiffs may often rely more heavily on their probability of 
success than on the likelihood of harm.”136 She also emphasized that, while 
Chief Justice Roberts was correct that preliminary injunctive relief “is not 
warranted ‘simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury,’” 
nevertheless the injury need not already have been inflicted when the plaintiff 
seeks a preliminary injunction.137 Nor need it be certain to occur in the future 
because “a strong threat of irreparable injury before trial is an adequate basis” 
for an award of preliminary injunctive relief.138 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg 
would have held: 
In light of the likely, substantial harm to the environment, NRDC’s almost 
inevitable success on the merits of its claim that NEPA required the Navy to 
prepare an EIS, the history of this litigation, and the public interest, I cannot 
agree that the mitigation measures the District Court imposed signal an abuse 
of discretion.139 
She also made the following observation about the “sliding scale” test: “This 
Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so 
today.”140 
I suggest to my students that it is highly significant that Chief Justice 
Roberts chose not to respond to Justice Ginsburg’s observation regarding the 
viability of the “sliding scale” test, especially since he devoted a lengthy 
footnote to setting forth his responses to both the concurring and dissenting 
opinions in Winter.141 By not responding, I suggest to my students he may have 
left the door open for the United States Supreme Court to approve a federal 
 
 133. Winter, 555 U.S. at 51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. 
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 138. Winter, 555 U.S. at 52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
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 139. Winter, 555 U.S. at 53–54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 51. 
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circuit court’s “sliding scale” test for preliminary injunctions that does not 
include the mere possibility of irreparable harm standard. Put another way, the 
Supreme Court might be willing to approve a “sliding scale” test which 
requires proof that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary injunctive relief, but which does not require proof that 
the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. For example, such a hypothetical 
“sliding scale” test might require proof of serious questions on the merits 
coupled with proof that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary injunctive relief, plus proof that the balance of 
hardships tips sharply to the plaintiff and proof that the injunction is in the 
public interest. 
V.  CRAFTING A NEW “SLIDING SCALE” TEST AFTER WINTER 
Somewhat ironically, the task of crafting a new Ninth Circuit “sliding 
scale” test after Winter fell to Judge William A. Fletcher, the author of Earth 
Island II.142 He wrote the opinion for the court in Alliance for the Wild Rockies 
v. Cottrell,143 a case in which an environmental organization sought to enjoin a 
post-fire timber salvage sale by the United States Forest Service (“USFS”) in 
order to protect “its members’ ability to ‘view, experience, and utilize’ the 
areas” at issue in their undisturbed state.144 Citing Winter, the district court had 
denied Alliance for the Wild Rockies’s (“AWR’s”) motion for a preliminary 
injunction on the ground that the plaintiff “had not shown the requisite 
likelihood of irreparable injury and success on the merits.”145 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed, directing the district court to issue a preliminary injunction 
under the Ninth Circuit’s new, post-Winter “sliding scale” test.146 I assign the 
Alliance for the Wild Rockies case to my students so that we can have a 
conversation about the process by which the Ninth Circuit crafted its post-
Winter “sliding scale” test. 
Judge Fletcher opened his opinion in Alliance for the Wild Rockies with a 
statement of the facts, explaining that, in the fall of 2007, the Rat Creek 
Wildfire had burned about 27,000 acres of land in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
National Forest in Montana.147 On July 1, 2009, the Chief Forester of the 
USFS made an Emergency Situation Determination for the Rat Creek Salvage 
Project (“the Project”), permitting “the immediate commencement of the 
Project’s logging without any of the delays that might have resulted from the 
 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 143. 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Forest Service’s administrative appeals process.”148 The Project permitted the 
salvage logging of trees on 1652 of the 27,000 acres of land that had burned.149 
The purposes of the Project were to salvage the timber that was dead or dying 
and to reforest the harvested areas with healthy trees.150 In April of 2009, the 
USFS released an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) of the Project for public 
comment.151 On July 22, 2009, the USFS issued the final EA, which concluded 
that the Project would have no significant environmental impact, and therefore 
an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) would not be required under 
NEPA.152 The USFS then initiated a bidding process, and on July 30, 2009, 
Barry Smith Logging was declared the highest bidder.153 On August 14, 2009, 
the district court denied AWR’s request for a preliminary injunction.154 Barry 
Smith Logging began work on the Project in August, 2009, and approximately 
49% of the planned logging was completed in the fall of 2009 before the 
winter conditions halted the operations.155 
Judge Fletcher began his analysis of the plaintiff’s request for a 
preliminary injunction with the following observation: “In Winter, the 
Supreme Court disagreed with one aspect of this circuit’s approach to 
preliminary injunctions. We had held that the ‘possibility’ of irreparable harm 
was sufficient, in some circumstances, to justify a preliminary injunction. 
Winter explicitly rejected that approach.”156 Judge Fletcher went on to explain 
that, under Winter, plaintiffs must prove that “irreparable harm is likely, not 
just possible.”157 At the same time, he emphasized the fact that the majority 
opinion in Winter “did not, however, explicitly discuss the continuing validity 
of the ‘sliding scale’ approach to preliminary injunctions employed by this 
circuit and others.”158 Under the “sliding scale” approach, he explained, “the 
elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger 
showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.”159 Finally, 
Judge Fletcher observed that Justice Ginsburg had “explicitly noted” in her 
 
 148. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1129. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1130. 
 153. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1130. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1131. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. 
 159. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
710 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:689 
dissent in Winter that the “Court has never rejected [the sliding scale] 
formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.”160 
Based on his analysis of Winter, Judge Fletcher plunged into the task of 
reformulating the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” test so that it could continue 
to exist while comporting with the requirements of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion. He looked at the second part of the Ninth Circuit’s pre-
Winter sliding scale test, which permitted a court to grant a preliminary 
injunction upon proof that “serious questions going to the merits were raised 
and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.”161 He decided 
that the second part of the Ninth Circuit’s pre-Winter “sliding scale” test could 
be salvaged post-Winter, provided the Ninth Circuit reframed it so that it 
complied with the spirit of Winter’s four-prong test.162 He called the reframed 
test the “serious questions” approach.163 He also announced: “[W]e join the 
Seventh and the Second Circuits in concluding that the ‘serious questions’ 
version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.”164 More specifically, he held that 
proof of “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that 
tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary 
injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 
irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”165 
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s post-Winter “serious questions sliding scale 
test” to the facts of the case before him, Judge Fletcher held that the plaintiff 
was entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.166 He found that the plaintiff had 
proven “serious questions” going to the merits because the USFS had not 
followed proper administrative procedures when it had granted the Emergency 
Situation Determination.167 Then Judge Fletcher found that the plaintiff had 
proven a likelihood of irreparable harm because it had proven that its members 
used the partially burned-out forest at issue for “work and recreational 
purposes, such as hunting, fishing, hiking, horseback riding, and cross-country 
skiing.”168 Next, he concluded that the “balance of hardships between the 
parties tips sharply in favor of AWR” because “[o]nce [the acres at issue] are 
logged, the work and recreational opportunities that would otherwise be 
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available on that land are irreparably lost,” whereas the hardship to the USFS 
was only “an estimated potential foregone revenue of ‘as much as 
$16,000.’”169 Finally, he found that the injunction would be in the public 
interest because he found that the public interest “in preserving nature and 
avoiding irreparable environmental injury” far outweighed the competing 
public interest in creating “18 to 26 temporary jobs” that would have had only 
“indirect beneficial effects on other aspects of the local economy” for a period 
of one year.170 
There were three judges on the Ninth Circuit panel in the Alliance for the 
Wild Rockies case—Circuit Judge Fletcher, Circuit Judge Rawlinson, and 
District Judge Mosman from the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.171 
Judge Mosman wrote a concurring opinion that I assign to my students because 
it gives them a trial court judge’s perspective on the importance of preserving 
the “serious questions” sliding scale test for determining whether to grant 
preliminary injunctive relief. Judge Mosman began his concurring opinion 
with a plea for preserving the flexibility that is the “hallmark of relief in 
equity.”172 He then observed that the task of presiding over a preliminary 
injunction hearing is often a “delicate and difficult balancing act” because the 
trial court judge is faced with “complex factual scenarios teed up on an 
expedited basis” and the parties can conduct only limited discovery.173 He 
emphasized the fact that a district court judge at the preliminary injunction 
stage is in a “much better position to predict the likelihood of harm than the 
likelihood of success.”174 In the Alliance for the Wild Rockies case, for 
example, he noted that the parties could easily agree that more than 1600 acres 
would be logged if no preliminary injunction were issued.175 He acknowledged 
that the parties had their disagreements about the implications of the logging—
“such as the extent of the environmental impact or the value of natural 
recovery”—but he kept his focus on the fact that the amount of acreage that 
would be logged was undisputed.176 
By contrast, he said that “predicting the likelihood of success is another 
matter entirely.”177 He reemphasized the accelerated schedule of preliminary 
injunction hearings, and then said: “The parties are often mostly guessing 
about important factual points that go, for example, to whether a statute has 
been violated, whether a noncompetition agreement is even valid, or whether a 
 
 169. Id. at 1137–38. 
 170. Id. at 1138–39. 
 171. Id. at 1128. 
 172. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1139 (Mosman, J., concurring). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1139 (Mosman, J., concurring). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
712 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:689 
patent is enforceable.”178 He observed that the legal arguments regarding the 
likelihood of success, “while not exactly half-baked, do not have the clarity 
and development that will come later” during the trial of the case.179 In this 
setting, he suggested that it can seem “almost inimical to good judging to 
hazard a prediction about which side is likely to succeed” (using the language 
of the Winter test).180 For that reason, he suggested that in many, if not most, 
cases “the better question to ask is whether there are serious questions going to 
the merits.”181 In his opinion, “[t]hat question has a legitimate answer,” 
whereas the question of whether the plaintiffs are “likely to prevail often does 
not.”182 
CONCLUSION 
After teaching the Alliance for the Wild Rockies case to my students, I 
suggest to them that its articulation of a “serious questions” sliding scale test is 
a godsend to those of us who live and practice law in the Ninth Circuit. It 
finally clarifies the Ninth Circuit’s law regarding the issuance of preliminary 
injunctive relief post-Winter. Of course, the longevity of the “serious 
questions” sliding scale test depends upon whether the United States Supreme 
Court will uphold it. My best guess is that, in the future, the Court will decide 
to uphold it. After all, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asserted in her dissenting 
opinion in Winter: “This Court has never rejected [the sliding scale] 
formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.”183 And Chief Justice 
Roberts offered no response to Justice Ginsburg’s bold assertion. Therefore, 
when I teach Remedies, I assume that Justice Ginsburg has predicted correctly 
that the United States Supreme Court will ultimately uphold the “serious 
questions” version of the Ninth Circuit’s “sliding scale” test. Consequently, 
unless and until she and I are both proven wrong, that is how I teach the law of 
preliminary injunctions after Winter. 
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